designated: US, EU
Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine
Reported manufacturer of the MD550. OFAC, 17 October 2024, EO 14024, for supplying engines to Russia's Garpiya line. [5][6]
case file 001 · sanctions-exposure assessment
A Beijing drone-engine reseller in the Shahed-136 engine lineage, designated by the United Kingdom in February 2024 and absent from US sanctions lists as of October 2026.
Original DRS analysis · public records only · prepared October 2026
Beijing Micropilot meets the public-conduct profile of Chinese engine suppliers the US has already designated, and an allied government has designated it for that conduct. We found no US listing. This is an exposure finding, not a recommendation: whether to designate is a policy decision that turns on evidence we cannot see.
The UK designated the company on 22 February 2024 under its Russia regime, describing it as a UAV company producing engines found in UAVs used by Russian forces in Ukraine. A director-disqualification sanction followed on 9 April 2025. [1][11][2]
highFrom at least 2013 the company advertised MD550 and MD275 engines, reverse-engineered copies of the German Limbach L550 and L275 that power the Shahed-136. Archived web snapshots support this. [3]
highAn August 2025 open-source analysis, citing insider information, describes the company as a reseller rather than the manufacturer and names Xiamen Limbach as the producer. A Ukrainian General Staff weapons-research officer reported in 2023 that Russian-built Geran-2 drones had switched to MicroPilot-branded MD550 engines. [4]
moderateThe US designated Xiamen Limbach on 17 October 2024 and Mado-network figures earlier for the same engine family. Beijing Micropilot was not included in those actions. [5][6]
highNo OFAC, BIS Entity List, or State Department listing was found. On 4 October 2026 we screened the company name and its alias directly against OFAC's Sanctions List Search and the Consolidated Screening List, which carries the BIS and State Department lists, using exact and fuzzy matching. This agrees with the aggregator record and the December 2025 expert review. [9][10][2][3]
highentity profile
Identifiers as they appear in the UK sanctions list and OpenSanctions. We did not contact the company.
timeline
Beijing Micropilot reported in business. [3]
Company website begins advertising MD550 and MD275 engines, per archived snapshots. Reported as the only firm besides the Mado network to do so. [3]
Hong Kong branch established. The Wisconsin Project timeline places it in 2013–2014; its December 2025 article gives July 2014. [3][7]
A Ukrainian General Staff weapons-research officer reports that Russian-built Geran-2 drones have switched from Mado MD550 engines to MicroPilot-branded MD550s. [4]
UK designates the company under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 for making available UAV systems and components. China’s embassy in London objects to the UK measures as a group. [1][11][12]
US designates Xiamen Limbach, the reported MD550 manufacturer, under EO 14024. [5]
Earliest archived capture of the company’s entry on Ukraine’s war-sanctions register, already noting the UK designation. [8]
UK adds a director-disqualification sanction. [11][2]
Frontelligence Insight reports, citing insider information, that the company resells MD550 and MDR208 engines made by Xiamen Limbach. [4]
Wisconsin Project review of Limbach-engine proliferation does not record any sanction on Beijing Micropilot. [3]
DRS finds no US listing in OpenSanctions' US datasets, then confirms the absence by screening directly against OFAC's Sanctions List Search and the Consolidated Screening List. [2][9][10]
peer comparison
The point of comparison is public conduct, not guilt. Designation criteria and the evidence behind them are not public.
designated: US, EU
Reported manufacturer of the MD550. OFAC, 17 October 2024, EO 14024, for supplying engines to Russia's Garpiya line. [5][6]
designated: US
Hong Kong and Iran-linked network that first marketed Limbach copies. US designations 2024 to 2025. [7]
designated: US, EU, CH
Yunnan maker of DLE engines found in Russian Gerbera drones. US listing 12 June 2024. [13][4]
Beijing Micropilot shares the engine lineage and the Russian end-use finding with all three, and the UK has acted on it. It differs in that public reporting casts it as a reseller, not a producer, and we found no documented shipment to Iran.
sources
Press notice naming the company and the engine finding. primary reliability: high
Aggregates UK FCDO list, UK disqualified directors, Ukraine register; ingests US lists, none present. secondary reliability: high
Engine advertising history from archived snapshots; no sanction recorded. secondary reliability: high
Aug 2025. Reseller finding rests on the outlet’s own insider information; reports a 2023 General Staff finding on engine switching; customs data on peers. secondary reliability: moderate
US designation date and authority. secondary reliability: high
PRC supply-chain mapping; sanctions status of peers. secondary reliability: moderate
Hong Kong branch and Mado designations. Consistent with [3] when read as laid out; machine-extracted text misplaces neighbouring 2023 labels. secondary reliability: moderate
Shows the UK as the only jurisdiction to have sanctioned the company; no listing date given. Archived captures from Feb 2025. primary reliability: high
Searched 4 Oct 2026 for "Micropilot" and "Maike Pute", exact and fuzzy. No match; closest fuzzy results were unrelated entities. primary reliability: high
Combined Commerce (incl. BIS Entity List), State, and Treasury lists. Searched 4 Oct 2026 for "Micropilot", "Micro Pilot", and "Maike Pute", exact and fuzzy. No match; fuzzy results were unrelated entities. primary reliability: high
Designation date, regime, stated reason, asset freeze, trust-services and director-disqualification sanctions. Corroborated by the Companies House disqualified-officers register. primary reliability: high
Chinese embassy response to the February 2024 UK designations. Not a statement by the company. secondary reliability: moderate
Allied-sanction dates for Mile Hao Xiang. primary reliability: high
gaps and conflicts
Method: public sanctions lists and registers, direct screening in official US government search tools, archived web captures as cited by others, expert reporting. No paid databases, no imagery, no direct contact with any party.
This assessment describes public records and reporting about a designated entity. It states no conclusion about guilt or about what any government should do. Corrections welcome at contact.drs@digitalrecon.solutions.
Describe the requirement. We reply with a scoping call, not a sales script.