case file 001 · sanctions-exposure assessment

Beijing Micropilot Flight Control Systems Co., Ltd.

A Beijing drone-engine reseller in the Shahed-136 engine lineage, designated by the United Kingdom in February 2024 and absent from US sanctions lists as of October 2026.

Original DRS analysis · public records only · prepared October 2026

bottom line

Beijing Micropilot meets the public-conduct profile of Chinese engine suppliers the US has already designated, and an allied government has designated it for that conduct. We found no US listing. This is an exposure finding, not a recommendation: whether to designate is a policy decision that turns on evidence we cannot see.

Key judgments

  1. The UK designated the company on 22 February 2024 under its Russia regime, describing it as a UAV company producing engines found in UAVs used by Russian forces in Ukraine. A director-disqualification sanction followed on 9 April 2025. [1][11][2]

    high
  2. From at least 2013 the company advertised MD550 and MD275 engines, reverse-engineered copies of the German Limbach L550 and L275 that power the Shahed-136. Archived web snapshots support this. [3]

    high
  3. An August 2025 open-source analysis, citing insider information, describes the company as a reseller rather than the manufacturer and names Xiamen Limbach as the producer. A Ukrainian General Staff weapons-research officer reported in 2023 that Russian-built Geran-2 drones had switched to MicroPilot-branded MD550 engines. [4]

    moderate
  4. The US designated Xiamen Limbach on 17 October 2024 and Mado-network figures earlier for the same engine family. Beijing Micropilot was not included in those actions. [5][6]

    high
  5. No OFAC, BIS Entity List, or State Department listing was found. On 4 October 2026 we screened the company name and its alias directly against OFAC's Sanctions List Search and the Consolidated Screening List, which carries the BIS and State Department lists, using exact and fuzzy matching. This agrees with the aggregator record and the December 2025 expert review. [9][10][2][3]

    high

entity profile

Who they are, on the record.

Identifiers as they appear in the UK sanctions list and OpenSanctions. We did not contact the company.

drs/entityUK list ID: RUS2108
name
Beijing Micropilot Flight Control Systems Co., Ltd.
aka
Beijing Maike Pute Aviation Electronic Co., Ltd. (UK list); Beijing Micropilot UAV Control System (used in reporting)
address
Room 409, Building 40, Huayanli, Beichenxilu, Beijing
founded
Reported in business since 2002; Hong Kong branch July 2014
identifier
ICP 11021902, recorded on the UK and Ukrainian lists; appears to be a Chinese website-licence number, not a company registration
business
UAV flight-control systems and drone engines
listed by
United Kingdom (2024); Ukraine register (online by Feb 2025)
not found on
OFAC SDN, OFAC consolidated, BIS Entity List, State Department (screened 4 Oct 2026)

timeline

What the public record shows.

2002

Beijing Micropilot reported in business. [3]

Sept 2013

Company website begins advertising MD550 and MD275 engines, per archived snapshots. Reported as the only firm besides the Mado network to do so. [3]

July 2014

Hong Kong branch established. The Wisconsin Project timeline places it in 2013–2014; its December 2025 article gives July 2014. [3][7]

2023

A Ukrainian General Staff weapons-research officer reports that Russian-built Geran-2 drones have switched from Mado MD550 engines to MicroPilot-branded MD550s. [4]

22 Feb 2024

UK designates the company under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 for making available UAV systems and components. China’s embassy in London objects to the UK measures as a group. [1][11][12]

17 Oct 2024

US designates Xiamen Limbach, the reported MD550 manufacturer, under EO 14024. [5]

Feb 2025

Earliest archived capture of the company’s entry on Ukraine’s war-sanctions register, already noting the UK designation. [8]

9 Apr 2025

UK adds a director-disqualification sanction. [11][2]

Aug 2025

Frontelligence Insight reports, citing insider information, that the company resells MD550 and MDR208 engines made by Xiamen Limbach. [4]

Dec 2025

Wisconsin Project review of Limbach-engine proliferation does not record any sanction on Beijing Micropilot. [3]

Oct 2026

DRS finds no US listing in OpenSanctions' US datasets, then confirms the absence by screening directly against OFAC's Sanctions List Search and the Consolidated Screening List. [2][9][10]

peer comparison

Firms the US has designated for the same engine family.

The point of comparison is public conduct, not guilt. Designation criteria and the evidence behind them are not public.

designated: US, EU

Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine

Reported manufacturer of the MD550. OFAC, 17 October 2024, EO 14024, for supplying engines to Russia's Garpiya line. [5][6]

designated: US

Mado network (Ma Jie, Qian Xi Long Trading)

Hong Kong and Iran-linked network that first marketed Limbach copies. US designations 2024 to 2025. [7]

designated: US, EU, CH

Mile Hao Xiang Technology

Yunnan maker of DLE engines found in Russian Gerbera drones. US listing 12 June 2024. [13][4]

Beijing Micropilot shares the engine lineage and the Russian end-use finding with all three, and the UK has acted on it. It differs in that public reporting casts it as a reseller, not a producer, and we found no documented shipment to Iran.

sources

Every source, rated.

[1] UK government, 22 Feb 2024

Press notice naming the company and the engine finding. primary reliability: high

[2] OpenSanctions entity record

Aggregates UK FCDO list, UK disqualified directors, Ukraine register; ingests US lists, none present. secondary reliability: high

[3] Wisconsin Project, Dec 2025

Engine advertising history from archived snapshots; no sanction recorded. secondary reliability: high

[4] Frontelligence Insight

Aug 2025. Reseller finding rests on the outlet’s own insider information; reports a 2023 General Staff finding on engine switching; customs data on peers. secondary reliability: moderate

[5] Iran Watch, Xiamen Limbach profile

US designation date and authority. secondary reliability: high

[6] Jamestown Foundation, Apr 2026

PRC supply-chain mapping; sanctions status of peers. secondary reliability: moderate

[7] Wisconsin Project timeline (PDF)

Hong Kong branch and Mado designations. Consistent with [3] when read as laid out; machine-extracted text misplaces neighbouring 2023 labels. secondary reliability: moderate

[8] Ukraine war-sanctions register, Micropilot entry

Shows the UK as the only jurisdiction to have sanctioned the company; no listing date given. Archived captures from Feb 2025. primary reliability: high

[9] OFAC Sanctions List Search

Searched 4 Oct 2026 for "Micropilot" and "Maike Pute", exact and fuzzy. No match; closest fuzzy results were unrelated entities. primary reliability: high

[10] Consolidated Screening List, trade.gov

Combined Commerce (incl. BIS Entity List), State, and Treasury lists. Searched 4 Oct 2026 for "Micropilot", "Micro Pilot", and "Maike Pute", exact and fuzzy. No match; fuzzy results were unrelated entities. primary reliability: high

[11] UK Sanctions List (FCDO), entry RUS2108

Designation date, regime, stated reason, asset freeze, trust-services and director-disqualification sanctions. Corroborated by the Companies House disqualified-officers register. primary reliability: high

[12] China News Service, 23 Feb 2024

Chinese embassy response to the February 2024 UK designations. Not a statement by the company. secondary reliability: moderate

[13] Ukraine war-sanctions register, Mile Hao Xiang entry

Allied-sanction dates for Mile Hao Xiang. primary reliability: high

gaps and conflicts

What we could not confirm.

  • No direct Iran shipment found. The Iran link is through engine lineage and the Mado network, not a documented sale.
  • US absence is a point-in-time, name-based result. It holds as of 4 October 2026 for the names and aliases above. A listing under an unrecorded name variant, or exposure through an owner or affiliate, would not surface in a name search. Re-screen on the date of any compliance decision.
  • Ukraine listing date not shown. The register gives no date of entry. Archived captures show the entry online by February 2025; an aggregator first recorded it in May 2024. [8][2]
  • Reseller vs producer. The UK press notice says “producing”, and the list entry cites making UAV systems and components available. The reseller characterisation rests on one outlet’s insider information and is not independently corroborated. Both can be true at different times.
  • No company response located. We found no public statement from Beijing Micropilot. China’s embassy in London objected to the February 2024 UK measures as a group. [12]

Method: public sanctions lists and registers, direct screening in official US government search tools, archived web captures as cited by others, expert reporting. No paid databases, no imagery, no direct contact with any party.

This assessment describes public records and reporting about a designated entity. It states no conclusion about guilt or about what any government should do. Corrections welcome at contact.drs@digitalrecon.solutions.

Tell us what you need to find out.

Describe the requirement. We reply with a scoping call, not a sales script.

Start a conversation